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IN PRINCIPLE BUT NOT IN PRACTICE: THE EXPANSION OF
ESSENTIAL STATE INTERESTS IN THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Jonathan Bellish*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Suppose that two sailors, A and B, are shipwrecked in the middle of the
ocean. Both sailors simultaneously notice a floating plank, but it is only big
enough to support one of the two men. Exhausted, Sailor A swims to the plank
first, but Sailor B, facing certain death, decides to push A off of the plank and A
drowns. Does B have a legally valid defense for his actions? Around 155 B.C.,
the Greek philosopher Carneades set forth this hypothetical situation, known today
as "the plank of Carneades," to posit that strict necessity could serve as a valid
defense for an otherwise unlawful action.' Indeed, the concept of necessity in law
is as old as Western society itself.
Over the years, the doctrine of necessity has moved beyond the municipal
realm, and now plays an integral role in the law of nations. Regardless of whether
the defense of necessity is a stated exception to the laws of war or a post facto
excuse for a breach of international obligations, essential state interests are at the
heart of the doctrine's invocation and application. Until the late twentieth century,
a state's "essential interests" were limited to those necessary to maintaining the
existence of a state in the face of foreign or domestic violence of a military nature.
This paper explores the expansion of the concept of essential state interests during
the late twentieth century, as it grew to include both ecological and economic
interests. Surprisingly, this nominal expansion did little in the way of expanding
the applicability of the doctrine of necessity as a whole.
Part II tracks the historical development of the doctrine of necessity under
customary international law from a mere diplomatic pronouncement to a formally
recognized doctrine capable of overriding express treaty obligations. Part III
expounds upon the role of essential state interests in the modern application of the
doctrine of necessity, showing that their primary function is to limit the use of the
doctrine. Part IV shows that the initial expansion of essential state interests to
include ecological interests, as seen in the Case Concerning the Gabdikovo * Jonathan Bellish is a Project Officer for the Oceans Beyond Piracy Project in Broomfield,
Colorado. He graduated in 2012 from the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law where he
focused on international and comparative law. Jonathan is also an alumnus of The Hague Academy of
International Law.
1. See, e.g., Khalid Ghanayim, Excused Necessity in Western Legal Philosophy, 19 CAN. J. L.
JURIS. 1 (2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--995343.
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Nagymaros Project, will not likely lead to a near term increase in the successful
use of the doctrine to protect such interests. Part V moves from ecological
interests to economic ones, and seeks to explain the dichotomy in the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Dispute's ("ICSID") holdings in CMS v.
Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina; the former ruled that the Argentine financial
crisis of the late 1990's created a state of necessity while the latter ruled that it did
not. Part VI suggests that ICSID jurisprudence following the CMS and LG&E is
proof that economic interests, despite their characterization as "essential state
interests" in LG&E v. Argentina, will not lead to an expansion of the successful
use of the doctrine. Part VII discusses the future of the doctrine of necessity as it
relates to ecological and economic necessity. Part VIII concludes.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The first case to mention the concept of necessity in the context of
international law was in fact not a case at all. Rather, it was a diplomatic dispute
between Great Britain and the United States of America. Nevertheless, "[i]t was in
the Caroline Case that self-defence was changed from a political excuse to a legal
doctrine." 2 Accordingly, the modem doctrine of necessity under customary
international law can be traced directly to the end of the Canadian Rebellion of
1837.
After the Canadian insurgents had been largely defeated, two rebels,
McKenzie and Rolfe, travelled to Buffalo, New York where they assembled a
force of several hundred men to carry out a rebellion.4 The group, made up
primarily of American citizens, openly invaded and took control of Navy Island, a
possession of the British, and held the island for seventeen days.5 During the
siege, the insurgents used an American steamship, "The Caroline," to make trips
between Navy Island and Fort Schlosser, an American military base in Buffalo, to
supply the rebels with weapons and ammunition.6 On the seventeenth night of the
siege, a British Colonel boarded "The Caroline" with approximately seventy-five
men and set the vessel on fire, sending it over Niagara Falls and killing two
Americans in the process.
Initially, the British acted as if there would be no repercussions for their
taking of "The Caroline," but when the Americans arrested Alexander McLeod and
charged him with murder and arson in connection with the taking, it became a
serious diplomatic incident.8 The British raised three defenses in response to the
charges against them, namely, (1) the piratical character of "The Caroline," (2) that
the ordinary laws of the United States were not being enforced, and (3) the defense

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 82 (1938).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 83.
Id.

7. Id.at 84.
8. Id. at 85.
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of self-preservation. 9 During negotiations between Mr. Webster, the American
Secretary of State, and Mr. Fox, the British Minister at Washington D.C., the
British quickly dropped the first two defenses and only spoke of self-preservation
in vague terms.o However, during the course of the diplomatic negotiations,
Secretary of State Webster sent the British a now-famous note clarifying the
concept of self-preservation as a defense. According to Webster, the necessity of
self-defense must be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation."" Furthermore, it must be shown that the moment of
necessity authorized the Canadian officials to enter the territory of the United
States, that once inside United States territory the Canadian officials did nothing
unreasonable or unnecessary, and that all other options were either unpractical or
would be unavailing.12
In response, Lord Ashburton was able to fit the facts of the taking of "The
Caroline" into the framework provided by Webster. 3 As a preliminary matter, the
taking of "The Caroline" was necessary because the insurgent forces were
assembled in America and the American government was either unwilling or
unable to stop them.14 Additionally, when the British went looking for "The
Caroline" they expected her to be moored off of Navy Island, and it was not until
the last minute that they realized that she was moored in American territory
leaving them no time for deliberation.' 5 Finally, Lord Ashburton justified the
measures taken as being reasonable, necessary, and narrowly tailored to the
exigencies of the situation. He claimed that the British forces attacked at night in
order to minimize casualties, set the ship on fire because they feared that the
current alone would not be strong enough to carry the ship away, and brought the
ship to the middle of the river to prevent injuries to persons or properties on the

bank.16
Although Lord Ashburton's response could be seen as an "ingenuous
attribution of altruistic motives to acts of a doubtful character,"' 7 Daniel Webster
accepted the apology with which Lord Ashburton closed his letter.' 8 In the end,
the two governments agreed on the principle of non-intervention and recognized
the narrowness of its exceptions.19
This chain of events is important to the development of the doctrine of
necessity under customary international law in that it moved away from a loosely
defined natural-rights conception of a state's primordial right to self-preservation
9. Id.
10. Id. at 86.
11.Id. at 89.
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Id. at 90.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 91.
19. Id.
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and replaced it with more concrete principles. Through Daniel Webster's
framework for self-preservation and Lord Ashburton's acquiescence to that
framework, the parties defined the limits of self-preservation, sought to establish
some substantive content to fill the framework, and subjected self-preservation in
violation of international customary law to the limiting condition of strict
necessity. It took almost one hundred years for the principles established in The
Caroline Case to enter a judicial opinion. 20 As is so often the case, they appeared
for the first time in a dissent. 2 1
The Case of the S.S. Wimbledon involved an English steamship chartered by a
French company shortly after World War 1.22 The ship, carrying 4,200 tons of
munitions, was headed for the Polish Naval Base at Danzig when, on the morning
of March 21, 1921, it approached the Kiel Canal in Germany.23 At that point, the
S.S. Wimbledon was denied passage through the canal because Germany had
declared itself a neutral in the ongoing Russo-Polish War and had issued Neutrality
Orders on July 25, 1920 stating that no ships carrying munitions destined for
Poland or Russia would be allowed to pass through the Canal.24 The delay cost the
ship thirteen days.25
On its face, the denial of passage on the part of the German government
directly contradicted Article 380 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, a treaty that
Germany signed and ratified at the end of the First World War, which read, "[t]he
Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of
commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire
equality." 26 The Permanent Court of International Justice agreed that this
provision was binding notwithstanding German neutrality. 27
According to the majority, the effect of Article 380 was that the Kiel Canal
ceased to be an internal waterway under the sovereign control of the riparian
power and instead became an international waterway intended to provide
universally available access to the Baltic Sea. 28 The only condition affecting the
provision was that the nation seeking passage be at peace with Germany. 29 The
S.S. Wimbledon, "belonging to a nation at that moment at peace with Germany,
was entitled to free passage,, 3 0 and no claims of neutrality or sovereignty could
override the international obligations created by the treaty provision in question.3 '

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 36 (Aug. 17).
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Treaty of Versailles art. 380, June 28, 1919, 3 U.S.T. 3714.
S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 39 (Aug. 17).
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
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Accordingly, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that Germany was
required to pay all costs associated with the delay, with interest.32
In a dissent, Judges Anzilotti and Huber articulated for the first time that the
notion of necessity could allow a nation to abrogate its treaty obligations.33
If, as the result of a war, a neutral or belligerent State is faced with the
necessity of taking extraordinary measures temporarily affecting the
application [of a treaty] in order to protect its neutrality or for the
purposes of national defence, it is entitled to do so even if no express
reservations are made in the convention. 34
The dissenters went on to state that "[t]he right of a State to adopt the course
which it considers best suited to the exigencies of its security and to the
maintenance of its integrity, is so essential a right that, in case of doubt, treaty
stipulations cannot be interpreted as limiting it."35 Thus, the dissent concluded that
a state of necessity overrode Article 380 and allowed Germany to protect its
interests as a neutral power.36
Anzilotti's and Huber's dissent in The Case of the S.S. Wimbledon advanced
the doctrine of necessity under customary international law in two important ways.
First, it announced that a state of necessity could excuse a nation from its treaty
obligations. In The Caroline Case, necessity was used as an exception to
uncodified custom, and it is unclear whether such a defense would have been valid
if the actions taken in The Caroline Case contradicted an express treaty obligation.
Second, the dissent in The Case of the S.S. Wimbledon advanced the notion that the
protection of essential state interests was the underlying rationale for invoking
necessity in abrogating international obligations. In this case, Germany's interest
in maintaining its security and integrity was seen as essential enough to merit a
defense of necessity. 37 Indeed, until the late twentieth century, national security
was seen as the only state interest essential enough to merit a valid necessity
defense.38 However, it took considerably less time for the doctrine of necessityat least as it relates to existential interests and express treaty obligations-to move
from the dissent to the majority.
The Lawless Case was the first of its kind in two important respects. In
addition to being the first opinion delivered by the European Court of Human
Rights, it was the first successful necessity defense raised by a country found to
have violated express treaty provisions. 39 In 1939, the Parliament of the Republic
of Ireland passed the Offenses Against the State Act in response to violent acts

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 1.C.J. 7, 68 (Sept. 25).
See Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1961).
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perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army ("IRA"). 40 This act outlawed
membership in any "unlawful organization" and allowed for the arrest and
detention, without warrant, of any person suspected of carrying out or conspiring
to carry out violent acts on behalf of an unlawful organization.41 On June 23,
1939, nine days after the Offenses Against the State Act entered into force, the
IRA was declared an unlawful organization under the meaning of the Act. 42 Many
arrests and detentions were made but were subsequently declared unconstitutional
by the High Court.43 As a result, Parliament passed an amended version of the Act
in 1940 which allowed for detention without trial "if and whenever and so often as
the Government makes and publishes a proclamation declaring that the Powers
conferred by this part of this Act are necessary to secure the preservation of the
public peace and order."4
From 1940 through the early 1950's, there was little IRA activity, but in 1954,
an outbreak of IRA violence led to the destruction of railway bridges, attacks on
police barracks, sabotage of telephone wires, and robberies of munitions stores.45
In response to the attacks, the Irish government activated the power of arrest and
detention from Section 3, Subsection 2 of the 1940 Act and published its
proclamation in the Official Gazette on July 5, 1957.46
On July 11, 1957, G.R. Lawless, a known member of the IRA, was arrested
for being a member of an unlawful organization while he was about to embark on a
ship to England. 47 Though he was supposed to be held for only forty-eight hours,
he was instead transferred to a military prison in the Currah, County Kildare,
known as "The Glass House." 4 8 He was subsequently transferred to a nearby
internment camp where he was detained for five months without formal charges or
a trial. 49 After exhausting his domestic appeals with no avail, Lawless introduced
an application to the newly formed European Court of Human Rights seeking his
immediate release from detention, payment of compensation and damages for his
detention, and payment of all legal costs incurred.5 0 Though he was released
shortly after his appeal was filed, Lawless continued to pursue his claim against the
government for compensation, damages, and reimbursement in the European Court
of Human Rights. '

40. Id. at 5.
41. Offences Against the State Act, 1939 (Act No. 13/1939) § 30(1) (lr.), available at
http://acts.oireachtas.ie/en.act.1939.0013.1.html.
42. Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7 (1961).
43. Id.
44. Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1940 (Act No. 2/1940) § 3(2) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1940/en/act/pub/0002/index.html.
45. Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1961).
46. Id. at 9.
47. Id. at 12.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id.
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As a preliminary matter, the European Court of Human Rights held that
Lawless' detention violated Article 5 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which states that "[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of
,,52
thtn
and that no person shall be deprived of that liberty unless "the lawful
person,
arrest or detention of a person [is] effected for the purpose of bringing him before a
competent legal authority."53 Additionally, Article 5 provides that "[e]veryone
arrested or detained ... shall be brought promptly before a judge . .. and shall be
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial."5 4 Because
Lawless was not arrested for the purposes of bringing him before a judge and was
not, in fact, brought before a judge within a reasonable time, the court found that
Government of the Republic of Ireland violated Article 5 (1)(c) and 5(3).5
However, Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides
for a necessity defense, and the European Court of Human Rights found that
Ireland acted within the bounds of Article 15.f Section 1 of Article 15 states that:
[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from
its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.57
According to the Court, the three prongs of a necessity defense under Article
15-the existence of an emergency threatening the life of a nation, the measures
taken being strictly required by the state of necessity, and the measures taken not
being in violation of any other obligations under international law-were all met
by the Republic of Ireland.
First, the Court found that the existence of a secret army carrying out
unconstitutional acts and operating both within and outside of the territory of
Ireland constituted a state of emergency that threatened the existence of Ireland
under the meaning of Article 15.59 Second, alternative measures-such as the
application of ordinary criminal law, the institution of special criminal courts or
military tribunals, or the sealing of the border between the Republic of Ireland and
Northern Ireland-would not have been effective in mitigating IRA violence.o
These alternative measures would not have worked, according to the Court,
because of the difficulty in amassing evidence against the IRA due to its secret
nature and the fear it instilled among the general population.61 Sealing the border

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

European Convention on Human Rights art. 5(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
Id. art. 5(1)(c).
Id. art. 5(3).
Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7 (1961).
Id. at 27.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 52, art. 15(1).
Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 34 (1961).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 29.
Id.
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would have burdened the general population beyond the extent required. 62 Finally,
the Court found no evidence suggesting that the acts carried out by the Republic of
Ireland violated other obligations under international law.6 3 As a result, the Court
unanimously held that there was no violation due to a successful necessity defense
under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights.64
The Lawless Case continued in the vein of the dissenting opinion in The Case
of the S.S. Wimbledon by basing a necessity defense on the protection of an
essential state interest-in this case described as "the life of the nation."65 It also
followed The Case of the S.S. Wimbledon in holding that a state of necessity can
allow a nation to abrogate an express treaty provision. It differs markedly,
however, from both The Case of the S.S. Wimbledon and The Caroline Case in that
The Lawless Case relied on an express provision in the European Convention on
Human Rights rather than an excuse under customary international law.
Nonetheless, Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights likely
crystallized the already-existing custom of necessity as a defense; it certainly did
not announce the custom itself. Thus, the doctrine of necessity is available to
states as an express exception in positive law and as an implied custom of the law
of nations. Regardless of the form the defense takes, essential state interests
remain at the heart of the doctrine of necessity.
III. THE ROLE OF ESSENTIAL STATE INTERESTS INTHE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY

As already alluded to, essential state interests play a central role in the
doctrine of necessity. Simply put, the primary function of the concept of essential
state interests is to limit a state's ability to invoke the doctrine. Article 25 of the
International Law Committee's Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Intentionally Wrongful Acts illustrates the importance of essential state interests.
Section 1(a) of Article 25 says that the state attempting to invoke the doctrine (the
invoking state) can only do so if it is protecting an essential interest. Similarly,
Section 1(b) says that the invoking state can only invoke the doctrine if it does not
impair an essential interest of the state against whom the doctrine is being invoked
(the victim state) or of the international community as a whole. 66 Thus, whether an
interest is characterized as "essential" by an international tribunal is dispositive in
deciding whether the doctrine of necessity can be invoked. Only if the invoking
state is protecting an essential interest and is not infringing on the essential
interests of the victim state or the international community as a whole may the
doctrine be successfully employed.
At the outer bounds of the doctrine lie peremptory norms. Peremptory norms
are defined as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
25, U.N.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 34.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 52, art. 15(1).
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, art.
Doc. A/56/49 (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
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States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character." 67 Where the doctrine of necessity is concerned, peremptory
norms are essential state interests that are inviolable except by subsequent
peremptory norms.
Accordingly, Article 33 of the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on the International Responsibility of States say that
under no circumstances may the doctrine of necessity be invoked if the breached
international obligation is considered a peremptory norm. 68
At bottom, customary international law imposes five distinct requirements on
the successful invocation of the doctrine of necessity. First, the doctrine must be
invoked to protect an essential state interest.69 Second, the essential state interest
in question must be threatened by "grave and imminent peril." 70 Third, the act
being challenged must be the only means of safeguarding the essential state
interest.7 1 Fourth, the act must not seriously impair the essential state interest of
the state towards which the breached obligation existed.72 Fifth, the state invoking
the doctrine of necessity must not have contributed to the occurrence of the state of
necessity.7 3
Until quite recently, states only invoked the doctrine of necessity in the face
of existential threats resulting from physical violence. Whether responding to the
exigencies of formally declared war, 74 domestic terrorism, 75 or informal
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

68. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 32nd Session, [ 1980]
2.Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Report of the
Commission]:
1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an international obligation of the
State unless:
a. the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential state interest of the State against
grave and imminent peril; and
b. the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards which the
obligation existed.
2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
wrongfulness:
a. if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in conformity arises out
of a peremptory norm of general international law; or
b. if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in conformity is laid
down by a treaty which, explicitly or implicitly, excludes the possibility of invoking a state
of necessity with respect to that obligation; or
c. if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state of necessity.

69. Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 1.C.J. 7, 40 (Sept. 25).
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id.

74. See generally Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
75. See generally Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4-5 (1961) ("On several
occasions since the foundation of the Irish Free State, armed groups, calling themselves the 'Irish
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insurgency,76 the threat leading to the invocation of the doctrine of necessity had
However, in 1997, the International
always been primarily military in nature.
Court of Justice considered expanding the concept of essential state interests for
the first time in the Case Concerning the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project.7 8
Though the International Court of Justice ("IC")declined to find that the doctrine
of necessity was successfully invoked, in holding that a state's ecological interests
can be considered essential for the purpose of invoking the doctrine of necessity,
the ICJ signaled to many that the concept of essential state interestswas being
extended beyond military use.
IV. THE EXPANSION OF ESSENTIAL STATE INTERESTS IN THE CASE CONCERNING
THE GABCKOvO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT WAS AN EXPANSION IN PRINCIPLE BUT
NOT IN PRACTICE

The Case Concerning the Gabdikovo-NagymarosProject arose out of a treaty
signed in 1977 between the governments of Hungary and Czechoslovakia ("the
1977 Treaty").8 0 The 1977 Treaty provided for the construction of a system of
locks in Gabikovo, Czechoslovakia and Nagymaros, Hungary aiming to generate
hydroelectricity and improve navigation on the River Danube.81 The project,
which commenced in 1978, was to be jointly and equally financed, constructed,
and operated by both contracting parties. 82 In the late 1980's, however, the project
came under intense scrutiny from the people of Hungary who feared the ecological
impact of the project.8 3 As a result of this criticism, Hungary terminated its work
on the locks and Czechoslovakia petitioned the ICJ to issue an opinion on the
matter.
When the case came before the International Court of Justice, both parties
stipulated that the 1977 Treaty was fully in force when Hungary terminated its
work and that the 1977 Treaty did not allow for unilateral suspension or
abandonment of the project.85 To justify its conduct, Hungary relied on a "state of
ecological necessity." 86 This state of necessity was based on fears concerning
reduced groundwater levels, the contamination of groundwater coming from an
increase of silt, the extinction of flora and fauna relying on silt-free water supply,
threats to aquatic ecosystems stemming from the irregular flow of water coming
Republican Army' ("IRA"), have been formed, for the avowed purpose of carrying out acts of violence
to put an end to British sovereignty in Northern Ireland.").
76. See, e.g., R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 82-83 (1938)
(explaining that the Caroline case was the result of a rebel uprising).
77. Id. at 91.
78. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 1.C.J. 7, 36 (Sept. 25).
79. Id. at 41-42.
80. Id. at 17.
81. Id. at 17-18.
82. Id. at 24.
83. Id. at 25, 3 1.
84. Id. at 27.
85. Id. at 35.
86. Id.
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from the dams, erosion of downstream riverbeds, and a limitation and
contamination of Budapest's water supply.8 7 Compounding this state of ecological
necessity, Hungary argued, was Czechoslovakia's unwillingness to examine the
ecological impact of the project in light of scientific findings suggesting that the
impact would be more severe than expected.
The Court began its necessity analysis by stating that it would apply the
doctrine of necessity as characterized by the International Law Commission in
Article 33 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States and the international
customs reflected therein.8 9 It went on to unequivocally expand the concept of
essential state interests:
The Court has no difficulty in acknowledging that the concerns
expressed by Hungary for its natural environment in the region affected
by the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project related to an "essential interest"
of that State, within the meaning given to that expression in Article 33
of the Draft of the International Law Commission. 90
The International Court of Justice echoed the International Law Commission
in holding that essential state interests should not be reduced to interests
concerning the existence of a state, reiterating the fact that, between 1960 and
1980, "safeguarding the ecological balance has come to be considered an 'essential
interest' of all States." 9'
However, the International Court of Justice held that Hungary did not
successfully invoke the doctrine of necessity, despite the invocation's basis in a
now-recognized essential state interest, because Hungary could not prove that there
existed the "grave and imminent peril" necessary to invoke the doctrine. 92
According to the Court, apprehension of possible peril does not suffice to invoke
the doctrine of necessity. 93 Even if the ecological effects of the project constituted
a grave peril, such effects were not imminent since the completion of the project
was too remote, the ecological effects would only be realized over the long term,
and the specific nature of the ecological effects remained uncertain. 94
In barring Hungary's defense of ecological necessity based on the notion that
the ecological effects of the dam would only be realized over the long term and
that the full extent of these effects remained uncertain, the Court expanded the
concept of essential state interests to include ecological interests in principle but
not in practice.
With very few exceptions, ecological threats will only materialize over the
long term, and it is specifically because of their long-term nature that the full
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 1.C.J. 7, 42 (Sept. 25).
Id.
Id. at 43.
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extent of ecological damage will be uncertain until that damage takes place.9 5 It is
difficult to imagine a scenario in which a governmental or scientific organization
could state with certainty the exact extent of the ecological damage resulting from
a project before such damage reaches full fruition, or at least begins to cause the
damage sought to be avoided. It is even more difficult to imagine adverse
ecological impacts that would immediately be felt upon the completion of such a
project.
With respect to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, the Court seemed to hold
that for Hungary to have successfully invoked the doctrine of necessity based on
ecological interests, it would have had to complete the project despite its
reservations and wait for the ecological effects to sufficiently materialize. At that
point, it could tear down the dam it had created, thereby breaching the 1977
Treaty. Only then could a successful invocation of the doctrine of necessity take
place. This result would be both economically inefficient and ecologically
disastrous.
On one hand, this course of action would force Hungary to expend economic
resources to finish construction of a project that it no longer sees as being in its
self-interest only to expend more resources undoing the damage done. In such a
case, an efficient breach of contract would be in the economic interest of any party
faced with the false choice of breaching this contract and the duplicitous
expenditure of resources followed by an uncertain ruling in an international
tribunal. Additionally, it is clear that ecological damage, once done, is difficult
and often impossible to undo. With riverbeds permanently changed, species of
plants and animals permanently extinct, and water supplies severely contaminated,
it would take decades to return to the pre-project status quo.96
The Case Concerningthe Gabjikovo-NagymarosProject appears to present a
scenario perfectly tailored to the invocation of the doctrine of necessity. A state
faced with two options-ecological damage and breach of contract-chose the
latter in hopes of invoking customary international law frequently applied in cases
of existential necessity. At first blush, it would appear that the expansion of
essential state interests to include ecological interests would be the highest hurdle
between Hungary and a successful invocation of the doctrine. However, by
barring the invocation of the doctrine of necessity in the face of ecological dangers
that are not perfectly scientifically predictable or that would unfold over the long
term, the Court effectively excludes all ecological dangers readily imaginable. It
expands essential state interests to include ecological interests in principle, but left
the doctrine unavailable for these purposes in practice.

95. Id. at 43-44.
96. Id. at 35-36.
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MIXED MESSAGES IN CME V. ARGENTINA AND LG&E V.ARGENTINA
REGARDING THE EXPANSION OF ESSENTIAL STATE INTERESTS TO INCLUDE
ECONOMIC INTERESTS

In the late 1980's the Argentine Republic experienced a financial crisis
characterized by extreme price inflation accompanied by a deep economic
recession.9 7 As a result, the Argentine Government passed the State Reform Law,98
the purpose of which was to privatize government-owned monopolies in order to
stimulate the economy. 99 One of the monopolies broken up was Gas del Estado
S.E., a company that controlled Argentina's natural gas resources.100 In addition to
the State Reform Law, the Argentine government passed the Convertibility Law
10
The former of these laws
and the Ley de Gas in 1991 and 1992, respectively.o
pegged the austral (the precursor to the Argentine Peso) to the U.S. Dollar, while
the latter created a regulatory structure for the newly privatized natural gas
industry.102
Though this private structure worked well for both Argentine government and
investors for almost a decade, as the 1990s came to a close, Argentina was hit by
another economic crisis.10 3 This economic predicament proved to be even more
serious than that of the late 1980's, causing panic among consumers, creditors, and
government officials alike. 104 As a result of this second crisis, the government of
Argentina breached the Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT") it had signed with the
United States of America. 05 In response, two companies that had been investing in
Argentina's private natural gas market, CMS Gas Transmission Company
("CMS") and LG&E Energy Corp. ("LG&E"), filed suit at the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") in Washington, D.C.106
Although these cases were nearly identical from a factual and legal standpoint,
their results were completely divergent. The government of Argentina invoked the
doctrine of necessity in both instances and was successful in its dispute with
LG&E. It was unsuccessful, however, in its dispute with CMS.'0o This divergence
stems from the stark difference in the characterization of the facts in CMS v.
Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina.
97. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 1135
(Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev.-FILJ 203 (2006).
98. Law No. 23.696, Aug. 18, 1989, B.O. (Arg.).
99. LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,135.
100. Id. T37.
101. Id. J1 36,38.
102. Id.
103. Id.154.
104. See Argentina's Collapse: A Decline without Parallel, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 2002,
availableat http://www.economist.com/node/1010911.
105. Steven Smith et al., InternationalCommercial Dispute Resolution, 42 INT'L LAW. 363, 394-95
(2008).
106. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Annulment Proceeding, Jl 1-2 (Sept.
25, 2007), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet; LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, I 1-3.
107. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,1 163.
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CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina are virtually identical with respect
to the nature of the parties, the parties' claim against Argentina, the jurisdiction of
the disputes, and the legal arguments presented. Both CMS and LG&E are groups
whose investors had ownership interests in the remnants of Gas del Estado. CMS
had a 29.42% interest in Transportadora de Gas del Norte ("TGN"), 0 and LG&E
owned 45.9% of Centro, 14.4% of Cuyana, and 19.6% of GasBan,10 all of which
were newly privatized Argentine natural gas companies. 0 Additionally, both
parties had identical causes of action against the government of Argentina. Both
CMS and LG&E claimed that Argentina violated two provisions of a bilateral
treaty which stipulated that gas tariffs would be calculated in U.S. Dollars and that
tariffs would be re-adjusted every six months in accordance with the United States
Products Price Index ("US-PPI")."' They argued that Argentina breached these
obligations through the passage of the Public Emergency and Foreign Exchange
System Reform Law as well as through subsequent executive orders. The net
effect of which was the "pesafication" of the Argentine economy and forced
renegotiation of all public and private contracts.112
The government of Argentina presented the same legal argument during both
arbitrations. The Argentine government argued that it had not breached the
bilateral treaty, and, if the tribunal found that it had breached the treaty, the
government of Argentina invoked the doctrine of necessity under Article XI of the
U.S.-Argentina BIT and under customary international law, thereby excusing them
from the breach." 3
The ICSID took these similar sets of facts and, through a highly divergent
characterization of such facts, reached completely different conclusions. The
tribunal in CMS v. Argentina found that the government of Argentina was
precluded from using the doctrine of necessity under both Article XI of the BIT
and customary international law.11 4 Conversely, in LG&E v. Argentina, the
tribunal held that the doctrine of necessity was indeed properly invoked under both
the BIT and customary international law." 5
In CMS v. Argentina, the tribunal's characterization of the facts surrounding
Argentina's breach was done on a purely historical level. The tribunal offered a
description of the privatization process, the structure of CMS, the stipulations

108. Id. 1| 33.
109. LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 52.
110. Id. 144.
111. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 1 34; LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/1, T 60.
112. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, T 156; LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/1, T 64.
113. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,1139; LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/1, Jil 260-61.
114. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 1 105.
115. LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 11 264-66.
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created by the parties, and the financial crisis that precipitated Argentina's
breach.' 16
In applying the facts to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States, the
tribunal found that the invocation of the doctrine of necessity was improper.17
Under Article 25 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States, the doctrine
of necessity may only be invoked if it is the "only way for the State to safeguard an
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril" and "does not impair the
essential interests of the State towards which the obligation exists, or the
international community as a whole."" 8 Furthermore, a state cannot invoke
necessity under Article 25 if the state has contributed to the situation of
necessity.119
In the end, the tribunal concluded that economic interests do not constitute an
essential interest of a State, that Argentina did not face grave or imminent peril,
that the measures taken were not the only choice offered to Argentina,' 20 and that
the government's "shortcomings significantly contributed to the crisis."' 21 The
tribunal awarded CMS damages in the amount of $133.2 million, plus interest,
along with all of Argentina's shares in TGN.122
Conversely, the tribunal took a more expansive approach to factual
considerations in LG&E v. Argentina.123 Rather than merely stating as a matter of
historical fact that the Argentine financial crisis of the late 1990s took place, the
tribunal in LG&E examined the economic and social implications of the crisis. 124
For example, the tribunal noted that as a result of the financial crisis of the late
1990's, Argentina's gross domestic product ("GDP") fell markedly, which led to a
decrease in domestic prices, widespread price deflation, and a devaluation of
Argentine assets across the board.1 25 This, in turn, led to a drastic increase in
Argentina's country risk premium, which excluded Argentina from the
international credit market.126 As the crisis deepened in 2001, the Argentine public
made a run on the banks, forcing the government to pass a law limiting bank
withdrawals.12 7 The passage of the law limiting withdrawals led to massive civil
and political unrest, culminating in deadly riots and a rapid succession of five
different presidents within a matter of weeks.1 28

116. See CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8.

117. Id. Jil 10 1-02, 107.
118. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 66, art. XV.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. art. XV, 112(b).
CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 1 103.
Id. T 106.
Id. 38-39.
LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Jl 33-38.
Id. 155.
Id.
Id.1232.
Id.163.
Id. Jil 235-36.
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This characterization of the Argentine financial crisis was reflected in the
tribunal's necessity analysis. The tribunal in LG&E analyzed necessity through
Article XI of the BIT between the United States and Argentina, which stipulates
that the BIT does not preclude either Party from fulfilling its obligations to
international peace and security or its own essential state interests.129
In deciding to allow Argentina to invoke the doctrine of necessity, the tribunal
characterized the Emergency Law as a "stop-gap measure"o3 0 and a "swift,
unilateral action against the economic crisis that was necessary at the time." 31
The tribunal went on to say that the Emergency Law was necessary to maintain
public order and to protect Argentina's essential security interests.132 As an offer
of evidence that an essential interest was threatened, the tribunal cited a massive
10-15% increase in GDP decline, 3 3 a 60% drop in the Merval Index, which serves
as a metric for monitoring the Argentine stock market,134 a 40% drop in the liquid
reserves of the Central Bank of Argentina,' 3 5 almost half of the population living
below the poverty line,136 an extreme shortage in healthcare supplies and
affordable food,'3 7 and deadly looting and rioting in the streets. 138 The tribunal
concluded, "[w]hen a State's economic foundation is under siege, the severity of
the problem can equal that of any military invasion." 39 Accordingly, the Republic
of Argentina was excused from all damages accrued between December 1, 2001

and April 26, 2003.140
Taken alone, these two decisions provide little guidance regarding whether or
not economic interests should be considered "essential" for the purposes of the
doctrine of necessity. Further examination of ICSID decisions considering
breaches of bilateral investment treaties in the face of the Argentine financial crisis
shows that the expansion of essential state interests in LG&E v. Argentina did not
survive subsequent ICSID jurisprudence. Accordingly, it was a temporary
expansion in principle that never materialized as a matter of practice.

129. Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M.
124, http:// www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina-us.pdf.
130. LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 241.
131. Id. 1 240.
132. Id.11226.
133. Id. 232.
134. Id.
135. Id. T233.
136. Id. 234.
137. Id.
138. Id. 235.
139. Id. 238.
140. Id. 266.
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VI. THE EXPANSION OF ESSENTIAL STATE INTERESTS IN LG&E V. ARGENTINA WAS
AN EXPANSION IN PRINCIPLE BUT NOT IN PRACTICE

Subsequent ICSID decisions concerning Argentina's breaches of BITs as the
result of its financial crisis have taken the approach used in CMS v. Argentina,
holding that Argentina was not in a state of necessity at the time of the breach and
suggesting that economic interests are not "essential" within the meaning of the
doctrine of necessity. In Sempra Energy Internationalv. Argentine Republic, the
ICSID held that a defense of necessity was inapplicable in the situation at hand.1 41
The ICSID went further in Enron Corp. and PonderosaAssets v. Argentina when
it stated that "[t]he argument that [a domestic financial crisis] compromised the
very existence of the State and its independence so as to qualify as involving an
essential interest of the State is not convincing."l 42 In categorically rejecting
economic interests as "essential state interests," the ICSID underestimated the
severity of Argentina's financial crisis and did a disservice to the doctrine of
necessity as a whole.
By the end of 2001, every aspect of Argentine society was reeling from the
financial crisis. Inflation was skyrocketing, over a quarter of the country was
unemployed, personal income shrunk by half, and every bank in the country was
on the verge of collapse.143 People were rioting in the streets. 144 The social
consequences of the Argentine economic crisis are among the most severe
imaginable. There are currently forty-eight cases filed against Argentina before
the ICSID,145 and if the current trend in ICSID jurisprudence continues-and there
is no reason to think that it will not-the Argentine Republic is slated to lose more
than USD $8 billion in judgments against it, a sum far larger than its entire
financial reserve. 146
At the heart of the doctrine of necessity is the notion that "[t]he right of a
State to adopt the course which it considers best suited to the exigencies of its
security and to the maintenance of its integrity, is so essential a right that, in case
of doubt, treaty stipulations cannot be interpreted as limiting it." 47 As developing
countries continue to liberalize their economies and attract foreign investment, the

141. Sempra Energy Int'l v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 1 388 (Sept. 28,
2007), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&
docl d=DC694 En&caseld=C8.
142. Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award,
1 306 (May 22, 2007), http://arbitrationlaw.com/files/freepdfs/Enron%20v%20Argentina%20-%
20Award.pdf.
143. See Argentina's Collapse: A Decline without Parallel,supra note 104, available at http://
www.economist.com/node/101091 1.
144. Id.
145. See List of Pending Cases, Int'l Ctr. For Settlement of Inv. Disputes, http://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServletrequestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (last updated Sept. 24,
2012) (including at least forty-eight cases at the ICSID filed against Argentina).
146. William W. Burke-White, The Argentine FinancialCrisis: State Liability Under BITs and the
Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J.WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 199, 204 (2008).
147. S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 37.
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state must retain the power to act as a stabilizing force. An economic crisis as
severe as the one experienced by Argentina at the turn of the twenty-first century
poses a clear and imminent threat to both the security and the integrity of the state.
Thus, the reasoning employed in LG&E v. Argentina is highly preferable to that
employed in CMS v. Argentina.
Unfortunately, the ICSID has chosen a path that provides insufficient
protection for the interests of developing nations despite the presence of the
doctrine of necessity at customary international law, a device that has developed
over the last two and a half centuries specifically to protect the interests of a
sovereign state facing an existential threat. In choosing such a course, the ICSID
ignores the fact that "[w]hen a State's economic foundation is under siege, the
severity of the problem can equal that of any military invasion."148 In the end, an
initial expansion of essential state interests to include economic interests in LG&E
v. Argentina has proven to be an anomaly in the face of subsequent ICSID
decisions. It was a temporary expansion in principle but not in practice.
VII. THE FUTURE OF ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC NECESSITY

The Case Concerning the Gabdikovo-NagyrnarosProject and the line of cases
stemming from CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina leave the future of the
doctrine of necessity as it relates to ecological and economic interests unclear. In
both instances, international adjudicatory bodies have held the respective state
interests at issue to be essential for the purposes of the doctrine, but in neither
instance was the doctrine held to be fully applicable. While there are several
commonalities between the respective futures of ecological and economic
necessity, in the end, ecological necessity is more likely to survive as a viable
application of the doctrine than its economic counterpart.
Several things are clear regarding the future of both ecological and economic
necessity. Most basically, the International Law Committee's interpretation of the
doctrine of necessity in Article 33 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts will continue to provide the basic framework for
the invocation and application of the doctrine of necessity. As such, there will
continue to be five inherent limitations to the doctrine. First, the doctrine will only
be useful in guarding an essential state interest in the face of grave and imminent
peril. 4 9 Second, the doctrine cannot be invoked if invocation impairs the essential
state interests of the country against whom the doctrine is being used or those of
the international community as a whole. 50 Third, the doctrine will not be available
if its invocation impairs a peremptory norm. 5 1 Fourth, binding treaty language
can expressly state that the doctrine will not be available.152 Fifth, the doctrine will

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, T 238.
Report of the Commission, supra note 68, art. 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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not be available to a state that contributed to its own state of necessity.' 5 3 As
customary international law develops in this area, it will do so against the backdrop
of Article 33, whose inherent limits to the invocation of the doctrine will remain
intact.
Similarly, whether a specific ecological or economic crisis suffices in creating
the state of necessity required to invoke the doctrine will continue to be a question
of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact, to be characterized and applied by
international judges and arbitrators. Successful invocation of the doctrine will
therefore inevitably rest on the shoulders of the judges and arbitrators themselves.
The inherent factual nature underlying essential state interests as they relate to the
doctrine of necessity has both its advantages and disadvantages. As can be seen in
the dichotomy between LG&E v. Argentina and CMS v. Argentina, the possibility
of two sets of judges looking at the same set of facts and reaching divergent
conclusions based on their interpretation of such facts leads to uncertainty in
customary international law, hindering the eventual crystallization of the custom.
On the other hand, the factual nature of the concept of essential state interests
allows for the interpretation of such interests to expand as the judicial perception
of such interests changes. As the human rights regime of international law
continues to develop, ecological and economic interests will play a more
prominent role in the years to come.
Finally, there are three types of conflicts that can give rise to assertions of
ecological and economic necessity: (1) good faith mistakes by sovereign states, (2)
good faith business transactions that go awry, and (3) cases of exploitation by
While these three
multinational corporations over developing nations.
classifications are treated slightly differently in the realms of ecological and
economic necessity, they play an important role in both arenas. Keeping in mind
the Article 33 framework, the inherent factual nature of ecological and economic
interests, and the three classes of conflict that may give rise to invocation of the
doctrine illuminates, to a certain extent, the future of the doctrines of ecological
and economic necessity.
The biggest barrier facing the successful invocation of ecological necessity is
the requirement in Article 33(1)(a) that the threat to a nation's ecology be both
"grave" and "imminent." 54 As discussed, the scale and time frame in which
ecological disasters take place does not lend itself to concrete predictions.
Nonetheless, as humanity's understanding of the science used to model and predict
ecological change improves, scientists-and the legal advocates who rely on their
findings-will be able to predict the gravity and imminence of actions affecting the
environment with much more accuracy. In the end, the expansion of the doctrine
of ecological necessity seems as inevitable as scientific progress itself.
In the case of a good faith mistake on the part of a sovereign nation, a
situation similar to the one faced in The Case Concerning the Gabdikovo-

153. Id.
154. Id. at 34.
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Nagymaros Project,the doctrine of ecological necessity is highly likely to expand
as our ability to measure and predict environmental impact improves. When two
sovereigns begin a project in good faith and one wants to abandon the project for
ecological reasons, international courts have failed to apply Article 33(2)(c), which
says that a state cannot invoke the doctrine of necessity if it has contributed to its
own state of necessity. Leaving the door open to the invocation of ecological
necessity, in this instance, allows governments to exercise greater control over
their economic resources. This is especially important in light of the fact that, as
our understanding of the environment improves, projects can be started under the
assumption that they will be ecologically benign. If this assumption proves to be
false in light of improved information, reevaluation of the environmental
implications of any project after it has begun will be necessary. Additionally,
while this expansion might appear to increase the moral hazard involved in
ecological assessment, if a state is found to have been careless in its initial
consideration of the project, 33(2)(c) would undoubtedly bar the invocation of the
doctrine. Thus, at least in this context, the doctrine is highly likely to expand with
the global community's understanding of ecological impact, and this is an
unmitigated good.
The second class of conflict, a good faith business transaction that happens to
lead to a state of ecological necessity, will be rare. Multinational corporations are
profit-maximizing entities who seek to minimize the degree to which they must
pay for the externalities they create. As such, many transactions are carried out
abroad precisely because of lower environmental standards. In any event, 33(2)(c)
comes squarely into play in the case of a good faith business transaction that leads
to a state of ecological necessity. It would be difficult to argue that a state, in
pursuing its perceived economic interests, did not contribute to the state of
necessity resulting directly from that transaction. Ecological necessity is unlikely
to expand in this arena, but there is little reason to believe that a lack of expansion
in this context will have much of an impact on international custom overall.
Applying the doctrine of ecological necessity to cases in which a
multinational corporation exploits a developing nation for the use of its natural
resources, and this exploitation leads to a state of ecological necessity, amounts to
an unconscionability doctrine at customary international law. The creation of such
a doctrine would have several positive policy implications. It would serve to
protect natural resources, punish exploitative multinational corporations and
protect developing nations. It would also allow international tribunals to police
international trade, as it becomes an increasingly important part of the global
economy. On the other hand, expansion of the doctrine in this context would have
the negative effects of decreasing foreign investment by limiting the protection
corporations receive abroad.
Furthermore, allowing developing nations the
opportunity to breach contracts into which they freely entered offends the
traditional notion of freedom of contract. On balance, proving bad faith on the part
of a multinational corporation will be difficult, but if a state can prove bad faith,
there is no reason the doctrine of ecological necessity should remain unavailable
provided that the other criteria are met.
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When it comes to economic necessity, the future is less clear. There is no
doubt that the global understanding of markets and economic crises is in flux.
From the United States' housing crisis and resulting global asset meltdown to the
European sovereign debt crisis, economists all over the world are taking a fresh
look at the security and stability of markets. It is unclear, however, where public
opinion will rest or what effect it will have on the doctrine of economic necessity.
As such, the ICSID's treatment of Argentina in the line of cases already discussed
will play a large role in the continued limited applicability of the doctrine of
economic necessity.
While the three classes of conflict that could give rise to economic necessity
are the same as those giving rise to ecological necessity, it makes sense to subsume
the second two classes into one analysis. Thus, the future of economic necessity
should be thought of in terms of public versus private debt instead of the three
classes of conflicts mentioned above.
Simply put, sovereign debt crises lie outside the scope of the doctrine of
necessity. Sovereign states can already default on their sovereign debt or simply
print money to cover their outstanding debt. These actions are governed by the
Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, and the
sovereign bond market itself. States are already highly incentivized not to default
on their public debts, and the doctrine of necessity will do little to change that fact.
Due to the inherent nature of economic crises, it makes little sense to
differentiate between good faith dealings between multinational corporations and
developing nations and exploitation of the latter by the former. Unlike a state of
ecological necessity, economic necessity can rarely be traced to one single deal. In
the case of economic necessity, a combination of macro- and microeconomic
factors leads to a state of necessity. If the underlying state of necessity is present,
the nature of the specific deals leading to such a state will be irrelevant.
Because the facts necessary to invoke a state of economic necessity will be
rare, the custom developed in CMS v. Argentina and its progeny suggest that the
doctrine of necessity will remain unavailable to states despite the superiority of the
LG&E decision. The main difference between the ICSID's opinions in LG&E and
CMS is that the ICSID endeavored to characterize the social consequences of
Argentina's economic collapse in the former and wholly overlooked such
consequences in the latter. Nonetheless, the rationale employed in CMS carried the
day and developed a custom which suggests that economic interests are
unavailable for protection as essential state interests under the meaning of Article
33. Moreover, even if such interests were theoretically available, 33(2)(c) bars a
state from successfully invoking them. The custom developed in CMS and its
progeny effectively shuts the door to the future invocation of the doctrine of
necessity to protect economic interests.
In sum, the doctrine of ecological necessity is likely to expand as the science
behind ecological impacts improves. The scientific community's increased ability
to predict and quantify environmental impacts will surely result in an increase of
the availability of the doctrine of ecological necessity. However, the ICSID's
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jurisprudence in CMS v. Argentina and its progeny is likely to close the door on the
availability of the doctrine of economic necessity.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The history of the doctrine of necessity has seen three types of interests
qualify as "essential state interests": territorial interests, ecological interests, and
economic interests. Of these three sets of interests, only one, territorial interests in
the face of a military or quasi-military attack, has yielded a successful invocation
of the doctrine. Textually speaking, it would appear that once an interest has been
deemed "essential" for the purposes of the doctrine, a grave threat to such interests
would easily lead to a successful invocation of the doctrine, but that clearly is not
the case.
In holding that an ecological interest can only lead to a successful invocation
of the doctrine of necessity if the ecological disaster will occur immediately and
with certainty, the International Court of Justice woefully ignores the inherent
nature of environmental degradation, thereby effectively barring the invocation of
the doctrine despite the presence of a threat to an essential state interest. Similarly,
after declaring economic interests to be essential, the ICSID reneged on that
declaration by refusing to apply the doctrine of necessity in the face of the gravest
and most imminent threat to a nation's economy imaginable.
As our
understanding of the science behind environmental degradation improves,
ecological necessity will become a viable doctrine. However, the door to
economic necessity appears to be shut for the foreseeable future.
The development of customary international law is, by its very nature, a slow
process. Declaring that ecological and economic interests are "essential" within
the meaning of the doctrine of necessity is an important step towards the
liberalization of the use of the doctrine of necessity. However, if customary
international law seeks to keep pace with modem realities, it would do well to
recognize the long term and uncertain nature of ecological considerations and the
existential threat posed by the collapse of a nation's economy. Once this
recognition takes place, these realities should be incorporated into the doctrine of
necessity at customary international law.
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